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Corruption and organized crime: Lessons from history* 
 
MARGARET E. BEARE 
York University, Nathanson Center for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, 
Toronto, Canada 
 
 
Abstract. The intention of this paper is to serve in part as a warning to the international 
community concerned about corruption, to keep the focus based on the critical analysis of 
empirically verifiable information. In ways similar to how theorists spoke about organized 
crime in the 1960s and 1970s, articles today attempt to refer to corruption as if there were one 
agreed upon definition. However, like the concept “organized crime”, the term “corruption” 
involves diverse processes which have different meanings within different societies. Corruption 
(or a focus on corruption), may be the means toward very diverse ends and each may have 
a different impact on the society. While in some societies corruption may correctly be seen 
to be the “cause” of forms of social disorganization, in other situations corruption may be 
the “result” of larger changes. Understanding the processes within a specific context allows 
one to understand the nature of the corruption. Corruption rhetoric may too easily become a 
political platform for ranking and evaluating nations as to their worth based on criteria that 
lose meaning when applied across jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
If money laundering was the “buzz phrase of crime”1 in the mid-1990’s, 
corruption has become the competing phrase as we prepare to enter the next 
century. Nothing in this paper is intended to diminish the importance and 
seriousness of the issues relating to corruption but rather to encourage an 
informed, analytical approach to the issues. Nationally as well as 
internationally, most jurisdictions have serious and distinct problems relating 
to gaining and maintaining a “corruption” free environment. However, as 
presented by the media, the concept’s meaning is kept vague, and those 
found to be guilty of being “corrupt” bear little resemblance to each other. 
The public is presented with an easy to understand stereotypical picture of 
the manipulation of greed and stealth with little of the diversity and 
complexity that the concept may entail. My intention in this paper is to 
suggest that we must apply the lessons we have learned from the decades 
of rhetoric concerning “organized crime” to the concept of “corruption”. 
 
                                                            
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Society of Criminology meetings, Chicago, 
November, 1996. 
  
Lessons from organized crime 
 
Fuelled to some extent by the various debates that resulted from the 1967 
US Task Force on Organized Crime2  we have come to realize that 
organized crime rhetoric may serve public officials in ways unrelated to 
issues of criminal justice and control. Politicians, the media, and law 
enforcement take positions and win resources and/or support based not only 
on the size of a particular threat to the society but also on the nature of the 
threat. While the threat may be real, the portrayal of the threat distorts the 
image and uses up some of the scarce resources. Empirical and critical 
analyses have often been overshadowed by rhetoric. Little has been 
accomplished by making this criminal activity too all encompassing, too 
omnipotent, or too “distinct” from anything we have learned about other 
forms of crime and criminal operations. With organized crime we have had 
to “walk backwards” to appreciate that there are concrete processes and 
definable issues that could be studied and specifically addressed with 
policy and legislation. Without a clear understanding of the complexities of 
the processes that make up organized crime, efforts aimed at 
reduction/elimination will have little impact. Organized crime itself is not 
any one thing. From a law enforcement perspective, you have not one 
“concept” but several. I have argued3 that organized crime ought to be 
responded to as a process rather than as some uniform criminal activity. The 
processes can then be dissected, understood and responded to appropriately. 
During the 1960’s and 1970’s we created a monolithic monstrosity out 
of the concept of “organized crime” which we are only now attempting to 
dismantle. The accusation of some critics has been that the focus on 
Mafialike operations diverted attention away from other organized crime 
 groups and away from the reasons why the criminal activity existed.4 
Writers have argued that there was a preferred political and law 
enforcement view that created: 
• a public image of organized crime that resulted in increasing 
resources to fight the threat; 
• a justification for the fact that law enforcement actions were having 
little impact on the criminal activity due to its size, scope, and 
imperviousness;  
• an “alien” conspiracy notion that separated organized crime from 
“normal” society and therefore distanced organized crime from the 
corruption and collusion of public officials and law enforcement.5 
What must be emphasized and reemphasised is that something considered 
to be of value is provided by organized criminals – either in the form of 
goods, services, protection, assistance through an unwieldy system, and/or 
job security. Therefore even though organized criminals violate moral codes, 
notions of democratic rule, and fair competition (in addition to violating the 
law) organized crime becomes an integrated part of the economic and social 
fabric.6 Hence, there is little possibility of it being eliminated. 
Robert Merton’s observation regarding the manifest and latent functions of 
the political machines in United States during the early 1900’s can be applied 
directly to our understanding of organized crime7 and corruption. There are, 
as Merton states, a plethora of explanations as to why the phenomenon is not 
eliminated by law enforcement or by government (such as problems of 
training, resources, motivation, nature of the offences etc.) but more 
compelling and relevant are the basic latent functions that the activity is 
fulfilling. Merton discusses both the “structural context” that makes it 
difficult for essential needs to be addressed by strictly legitimate 
structures and the “subgroups” whose distinctive needs are left unsatisfied. 
• 
• 
 As a consequence: “. . .the functional deficiencies of the official structure 
generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to fulfil existing needs 
somewhat more effectively” (p. 127). 
Political machines in the United States operated between legitimate 
society and the less legitimate world of vice, rackets and crime and acted 
as a facilitator for both – with only slightly different rules for either side. 
As the political machines lost their positions of control in American 
politics and in countries that never developed a clear machine structure, 
corrupt officials and organized crime took over this role. In some cases the 
political machines or the parties in power knowingly used organized crime 
for their own political purposes. Political systems chose to collude with 
organized crime in order to stay in power, eliminate opposition, or fund raise 
through the involvement in illegal commodities, i.e., drugs. As Peter Lupscha 
states: “The use of criminal gangs by political machines to harass the 
opposition was a commonplace of our (US) urban history. But politics in the 
United States is not unique in this”8 (p. 2). 
He provides the following examples: 
• Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintant used the organized crime 
Triads of Shanghai as enforcers to massacre party members in 1927. 
• The French government used the Corsican organized crime 
groups of Marseilles as informal security agents against both 
French communists and right-wing military terrorists. 
• The US military occupation forces and Army intelligence, G-2, in 
Japan made similar tacit agreements with Japanese organized crime, 
the Yakuza, and helped establish their primacy in postwar Japan. 
• Organized crime triad society in China trace their beginnings to 
patriotic resistance to Manchus. 
• Italian organized crime groups began as opposition to foreign 
 occupations. 
• Corsican crime originated as nationalistic opposition to the French. 
 
It is essential to appreciate the interface between the legitimate and illegitimate 
operations within criminal enterprises. This interface is to varying degrees 
facilitated by corruption. However the one important dimension in which the 
processes employed by different organized criminals vary is in their ability 
to garner support and assistance via corruption. 
There is not full agreement as to how essential it is for organized crime to be 
able to corrupt officials – some prosecutors and investigators see the 
corruption as critical and others see it as exaggerated.9 Whether or not 
corruption is essential, Peter Reuter is correct in arguing that a corrupt 
political authority at the local level can be a “uniquely powerful instrument 
for organized crime.”10 The corrupt political machines that controlled cities 
like Chicago attest to this advantage. 
The ability to corrupt enables one to buy protection from enforcement, 
eliminate competition and therefore amass capital. However, different 
organized crime operations vary in their ability to garner support and 
assistance via corruption. Some criminal groups lack the level of integration 
and sophistication – at least when they are relatively new as a criminal 
organization. Without corruption as an option, violence is the method of 
“doing business”. Acts of violence that so distress the police, politicians 
and the public may indicate an unsophisticated organized crime group. As 
the group gains greater integration the levels of violence may decrease to be 
replaced with less visible, but potentially more intrusive forms of 
corruption. With growth comes an increasing need to corrupt. 
The ability to corrupt is therefore dependent on how integrated the 
individual or group is into the “legitimate” society. If they have secured 
positions of influence and power and therefore have entwined themselves 
 into the power structure through either the economic sphere, political 
alignments, or the enforcement/criminal justice field, their activities are 
more easily defined as legitimate. With this integration comes invisibility in 
that decisions taken, policies passed and agreements signed are not defined 
as corruption but rather as “normal” operations of business or enterprise. 
Therefore, the greater the ability to corrupt, the greater the ability to remain 
invisible, or to be seen to be legitimate – unless the entire system is blatantly 
corrupt and has redefined payoffs and the like as publicly recognized business 
procedures. The problem arises that at the most sophisticated integrated level, 
the ability to corrupt enables one to control the definitions of what is or is not 
defined as corruption. As Stier and Richards state: 
 
In its most advanced form organized crime is so thoroughly integrated into 
the economic, political, and social institutions of legitimate society that it 
may no longer be recognizable as a criminal enterprise. Such integration 
represents the most serious potential for social harm that can be caused 
by racketeers. However, the criminal justice system is least effective in 
dealing with organized crime when it reaches this level of maturity.11 
(p.65) 
 
The organized crime activity and/or actions of corrupt officials reach deep 
into the particular society and broaden to become international. The “threats” 
posed by the final stage are not the illicit commodities themselves, or even 
corrupt business practices or extortion demands, but rather the reliance by 
legitimate business or political regime on the ability and willingness of the 
corrupted process to provide their services. At this point society’s institutions 
have themselves become corrupted. 
Citing examples is difficult due to the very fact that the activity has 
successfully avoided being classified as “corrupt”. However, a controversial 
 Canadian example relates to the activities of the tobacco industry. For 
several years prior to 1994, the tobacco manufacturers in Canada were the 
corporate entities which knowingly exported to the United States close to 
90% more cigarettes that the foreign market could absorb. It is estimated that 
from 80–95%12 of all exports to the US were reentering Canada. The 
remaining small percentage (between 5–20%) were being consumed by 
Canadian tourists or non residents. This excessive exportation supplied the 
commodity for the criminal smuggling activity. 
Just as in drug trafficking, in the cigarette smuggling industry there are 
suppliers, importers and a distribution network. One must ask at what point 
the tobacco corporations become responsible for the illegal activities that were 
perpetuated with their products. Canadian tobacco manufacturers exported 
1.8 Billion cigarettes in April 1993 – more than four times the figure from 
April 1992.13 During the first four months of 1993, exports had increased 
over 300% from the equivalent rates during the first four months of 1992.14 
Given that the foreign market had not increased by this margin, or likely at 
all during the year, the resulting excessive exported amount of tobacco could 
be argued to be “intended” for smuggling back into Canada for profit to the 
smugglers – and of course the initial sale for the tobacco company. 
The act of exporting excessive tobacco products outside of Canada could be 
interpreted as a significant facilitator of the tax avoidance, criminal violence, 
and wasted enforcement resources. The emphasis has not however been on 
attempting to hold the tobacco corporations accountable for a complicity 
in the growth of an organized crime enterprise around their products. Less 
powerful, less legitimate players in the smuggling scenario were targeted as 
the renegades, racketeers/or simply ordinary criminals.15 In her study of tax 
evasion and tax avoidance, Doreen McBarnet states: 
 
 
 To suggest then that the key to staying on the right side of the line is 
“not what you do but the way that you do it”, is not to imply simply a 
distinction in style, a matter of cleverness or moral choice, but to underline 
the significance of opportunity and resources. Manipulating the law to 
escape control yet remain legitimate is an option more readily available to 
large corporations and “high net worth” individuals than to the mass of the 
population.16 (p.71) 
The Tobacco corporations argue that their sales for export are indisputably 
lawful – and likely are, as we presently accept the dynamics of the cigarette 
issue. By exporting to the foreign jurisdiction tobacco corporations were 
avoiding selling their cigarettes with tax applied, knowing that others would 
commit the crime of tax evasion by smuggling the same commodity back into 
Canada. This may be a legal evasion on the part of the corporations, however 
it is tax avoidance deserving of serious ethical and criminal scrutiny.17 
As Edelhertz suggests, perhaps the best way to see the role of “corruption” 
is in relation to the ability of organized crime to exercise a wide range of 
power. There may be strict corruption in exchange for kick-backs or the 
power at the disposal of the criminal group may allow those individuals to 
gain control over a public process and in that way corrupt the system: 
The capacity to corrupt public processes provides significant regulatory 
advantages in terms of protecting an organized crime enterprise or 
operation as it moves into a new sphere of illegal activities, and to a large 
extent also can be used to protect existing markets from non-
organized crime competitors.18 
 
 
 
 International response to organized crime and corruption 
 
The international community through cooperative operations such as the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has encouraged nations internationally 
to re-examine aspects of the organized crime regulation and control processes 
via the study of the individual processes essential to organized crime 
operations, such as money laundering. This exercise – accomplished in a 
manner respectful of sovereignty issues – has advanced our knowledge and 
served to remove some of the stereotyping and mystique from organized 
crime. 
Aside from general guidelines, codes of conduct, model legislation and 
recommendations for regulatory scrutiny, international efforts against 
organized crime have tended to recognize that organized crime must be 
studied within the environments (host and home) where it is operating. This 
criminal activity is socially created via the creation of illegitimate markets; 
grows or shrinks related in part to the perceptions and reality of risk factors; 
and is dependent on the presence or absence of a demand. International 
collaborative pressure has been chosen rather than black-listing and ranking 
systems. 
Unlike this recent collaborative approach to strengthening the international 
community against organized crime, not all of the current approaches to the 
reduction of corruption are as collegial. The increasing focus on the concept 
of “corruption” is more reminiscent of the 1960’s focus on organized crime. 
The notion appears to be that corruption is “out there” and can be eliminated 
by drawing up charts illustrating which countries are the most guilty. This 
portrayal denies the intertwining of legitimate with corrupt practices, people, 
and policies; denies the diverse degrees and types of corruption; and attempts 
to understand the “corruption” in isolation from its historical, political and 
 social context. Perhaps most importantly, this approach assumes common 
understandings about what constitutes “corrupt” actions and ignores the fact 
that the concept of corruption does not mean the same thing across 
jurisdictions. 
Just as the concept “organized crime” was used as if it signified one 
uniform type of criminal operation, likewise the concept “corruption” is 
used as if its meaning and practice are shared across countries. The 
complexity in understanding corruption across jurisdictions is in accepting 
that there are different definitions, different expectations and traditions, 
different opportunities and options and different sanctions for violations. 
We forget the most basic of sociological lessons about ethnocentrism. 
While analyses of corruption acknowledge that there are historic reasons 
why a society might be more or less tolerant concerning “corrupt” 
behaviour, they often fail to take this awareness further to see that the 
concept itself is what is significantly different across jurisdictions. While 
some categories of behaviour may be more widely perceived to be corrupt, 
other forms of behaviour are more disputed. What is or is not “corrupt” is 
just different. Somewhat arbitrarily, we can identify from a western, 
capitalist perspective, at least four categories of corruption that may serve 
to illustrate the diversity of the concept: 
 
1. Bribes/kick-backs. Payments are demanded or expected in return for 
being allowed to do legitimate business. The payment becomes the license 
to do business. Those who make the payments are allowed to compete 
or to win contracts. 
2. Election/Campaign Corruption. Illegal payments are made at the time of 
elections to ensure continuing influence; 
3. Protection. Officials accept payments (or privilege) from criminal 
 organizations in exchange for permitted them to engage in illegitimate 
businesses; 
4. Systemic top-down corruption. A nation’s wealth is systematically syphoned 
off or exploited by the ruling elites. 
Clearly, these four categories or not exhaustive nor are they exclusionary. 
They are listed mainly to indicate that the “harm” from each is not uniform 
and the victims vary across the types. 
 
 
Bribes/kick-backs 
 
This category includes the vast array of small to large payments that are 
demanded or expected in order to get permission to operate. These bribes 
may facilitate the acquisition of permits, licenses, or contracts. The person 
who is expected to pay is merely wishing to conduct some normal legitimate 
business or transaction of some sort – possibly wishing to have an advantage 
over other applicants. Forms of this sort of “corruption” in some cultures 
are defined quite favourably – i.e., according to Ernesto Savona, to be “sly” 
(furbo) implies that the person was able to take advantage of opportunities 
others might miss – as long as the corruption remains within certain limits.19 
He argues that criminal law and prosecutions became successful only when 
the corruption in Italy exceeded a physiological limit of a modern state. In 
Latin America, a public official has patrimonial duties to family, clan, clique, 
or party in addition to the duties to his office.20 Therefore: 
. . .police demand mordidas (“bites”) instead of issuing tickets; vendors 
obtain licenses by paying “speed money” to avoid bureaucratic lags; 
judges encourage out-of-court “settlements” slanted to the highest bidder; 
the national budgets contain secret presidential slush funds; and political 
 parties accept substantial undisclosed donations.21 
 
While there is the least consensus regarding this category of corruption, this 
category is gaining a large proportion of media attention. During the last 
few years, under the guise of public education, a number of international 
conferences and surveys22 have publicly ranked countries based on 
perceptions of international respondents as to the “reputation” for this 
particular form of corruption in each country. For example, “Transparency 
International” (TI) is a private organization that is attempting to eliminate 
corruption in international business transactions. TI completed several 
surveys concerning the “perceived” extent of corruption in different 
countries. The much reproduced “1995 TI Corruption Index” claims to 
assess to what extent corruption had an impact on commercial activities in 
various countries.23 Likewise, Leo Huberts surveyed international 
conference attendees on public corruption and ethics in the public service.24 
Huberts comments that comparative research of the sort he was doing was 
not popular with scholars. While he attributes this to the sensitive nature 
of the data, it could have to do with the nature and diversity of 
“corruption”.25 These surveys may accurately be measuring, accurate 
perceptions of the most unsophisticated forms of corruption, i.e., the 
demands for money by low level public officials and the payoffs in exchange 
for contracts. Perhaps this is the full extent of what is expected and claimed 
by the surveys. 
However, there are issues regarding this approach to corruption that must 
be acknowledged. First, power relations should not be ignored – either within 
any society or across nations. The Huberts survey indicates that there is an 
inverse relationship between “a country’s wealth and its public corruption 
and fraud”26 (which again should refer to the “perception” of the amount of 
 corruption since the survey deals strictly with perceptions). The reality is of 
course that while the corruption may occur in those countries, the corrupt 
payments are often being made by multinational corporations from “clean” 
countries. Some of these conditions that are being publicized in the “worst” 
countries may be directly or indirectly caused by the interference and global 
policies of countries perceived to be relatively corruption free. 
Second, the stated purpose of Transparency International is to “curb the 
increasingly rampant corruption stunting the development of poor countries.” 
Depending on the nature of the corruption, in some jurisdictions the level 
of corruption may result from a more prosperous era rather than the reverse. 
Likewise any sudden political or economic shift – such as into free-markets, 
democratic systems – may result in a temporary stae of heightened corruption 
and instability. The corruption may not be to blame for this chaos, but in 
fact may be reflective of it. What may be stunting the development is the 
low salaries, environmental destruction, and the flight of capital out of these 
nations into the developed nations. 
A third issue relates to how serious corruption, as defined by the 
international surveys, is regarded in the different countries. Different 
countries do not regard the presence of corruption to be equally serious. 
Two-thirds of the respondents from the lower income countries indicated 
that corruption and fraud were rarely isolated from other forms of public 
misconduct such as mismanagement, waste, power abuse. The majority of 
respondents stated that while corruption and fraud were serious, there were 
other more serious social and political problems.27 The reason for this may 
be obvious. The focus of much of the international work against corruption 
is on the impact that corruption is having (or perceived to be having) on 
commercial/corporate life. As business becomes global in scope, 
companies wish to be able to operate as inexpensively and rationally as 
 possible throughout the world.28 Systems of graft and bribes are 
unpredictable, unreliable and costly. This may seem relatively unimportant 
if your society is poor, violent, and politically unstable – in addition to 
having a high amount of corruption and fraud. 
The test for any country is the moment when profitable international trade 
becomes threatened by pressure to take governmental stands against violent 
and corrupt regimes. For example, in 1977 the US passed their Foreign and 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibiting businesses from paying bribes or 
under-the-counter fees to obtain contracts. They argue that this has cost them 
over 100 foreign contracts worth $ 45 billion to overseas rivals.29 The message 
is clear – if we cannot benefit from corruption as we define it, then no one 
should. 
There is increasing pressure on countries to replicate this law – or at the 
very least to end the tax advantages that certain countries30 have allowed. In 
the past, payment to an “agent” has been tax-deductible. For example, the 
forthcoming Convention against Corruption, 1997, drafted by the Council 
of Europe31 specifies that the offence of corruption should be extended to 
include the corruption of foreign officials and also that all financial and 
economic advantages to domestic enterprises having obtained businesses 
through corrupting public officials abroad should end. 
The corruption of governments (or within governments) is seen to 
operate against international efforts to create standards of uniform 
practice. As Nadelmann states: “Among all the obstacles to the long-
term harmonization of criminal justice systems, governmental corruption 
represents the most resilient.”32 
 
 
 
 Election/campaign corruption 
 
Election periods are commonly exploited as moments for obtaining 
“influence” and “access”. Cash to run successful, expensive campaigns, or 
threats to reduce the field of candidates are the main forms that this form 
of corruption can take. While the international community may send 
members to monitor the election processes, many voters in India, Pakistan, 
Thailand, and Zambia expect to have their votes bought.33 Likewise, after 
the elections, corruption has toppled or tainted elected presidents or 
prime ministers in Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Panama, Pakistan, Mexico, 
Spain, Italy, Turkey, Bangladesh and Thailand. 
Debate always follows the election in the US as the costs incurred by those 
candidates running for major offices are tallied in the hundreds or millions 
of dollars – $ 234.2 million to Clinton, Dole, Perot and several republican 
primary contenders in 1995–634 MacArthur argues that the fault does not lie 
with the lobbyists and businessmen alone. He states: 
 
Far more typical is the strong-arm techniques of a politician or his 
surrogate with something to sell; occasionally it is an intangible 
commodity called “access”, occasionally it’s a vote on a specific bill.35 
The public was entertained by stories of the renting out of White House 
bedrooms for sleep-overs and perhaps more serious, the links between Clinton 
and Indonesian campaign funds. Most serious of all is the massive mount of 
ongoing “access” and influence that is purchased via the political Action 
Committees. As MacArthur again states: 
A reformer backed by three billionaires is no more “bought” – and 
possibly less so – than a party hack. . . whose long career has been 
spent gouging money from millionaires, corporate chieftains and union 
 bosses numbering in the hundreds.36 
Cultural differences help to determine how a society will regard this type 
of corruption. Ernesto Savona describes a system of corruption in Italy that 
operates on a delicate balance. A focus on corruption allowed the country to 
discredit the reputations of the old and powerful political class and facilitated 
a shift toward a new political system. Corruption became the lever for change 
– however as Savona states: 
. . .it cannot be said that corruption will end. The major risk is that new 
corrupters will enter the corruption market having learnt the lesson of the 
Italian case. And, by thus becoming more sophisticated, they will be able 
to minimize the law enforcement risk.37 
In Latin America, critics point out that some of the most corrupt politicians 
are the ones speaking out the loudest against corruption. As the news-weekly 
Noticias in Argentine said: “Everyone accuses and everyone is accused. If 
everyone is corrupt, no one is”.38 This is similar to the situation descibes by 
Savona in Italy. He quotes the adage: “The more we are guilty the less we are 
perceived” – each defendant enlarges the circle by introducing others to the 
prosecutors. 
 
 
Protection 
 
A third type of corruption is the exchange of payments for facilitating or 
tolerating criminal acts. Certain organized crime activities are greatly 
facilitated by the presence of corrupt officials. Among the most obvious are 
drug trafficking, all smuggling operations, illegal gambling, and 
international operations that involve the importing or exporting of 
commodities. Second only to collusion between governments and organized 
 crime, corrupt relations between criminals and the regulatory and 
enforcement agencies may be used to fuel the criminal enterprises. Control 
agencies may facilitate the activity while ironically most dispute 
settlement activities that usually fall to these agencies are carried out inside 
the criminal organizations via the use of violence, intimidation and 
extortion. The control forces therefore provide the important service of 
granting the “permission” to operate. 
Analysts describe the impact of the new “democratic” freedoms within 
formerly communist countries or former dictatorships that have resulted in 
a temporary (or permanent) state of social disorganization. The result is the 
sense that everyone is on the take. Freedom of movement, new forms of 
commerce, a break down in the traditional forms of social control – coupled 
with the type of black-market activities that were necessary under the old 
regimes in order to survive, ensure rampant corruption within the new 
transitional systems. 
Just as new government arrangements and new political alignments create 
new opportunities for corrupt officials, so do new regulations and new laws. 
A quoted figure for detected fraud against the European Union’s budget in 
1996 was approximately 800 million pounds. This budget consists of VAT 
plus customs duties and agricultural levies paid on goods entering the 
Community from non-member countries. In a number of the most 
sophisticated transnational operations, government officials are complicit in 
the schemes. The regulations that determine when taxes are applicable or 
when previously paid taxes are reimburseable, open up a vast array of 
corruption opportunities. Likewise, numerous cases of corruption have 
been documented concerning the aid given to countries to assist in their 
transformation after either a political disruption or an environmental disaster. 
The most recent and ongoing case involves an accusation that two professors 
 from Harvard University were exploiting, for their own gain, a 
governmentfunded $ 57 million project in Russia. As the journalist stated: 
The case is certain to run and run, doubtless spawning law suits as it goes. 
But for the Russians it is, at the very least, a reminder that all is not always 
as rosy as it sounds either in the cradle of democracy or in the stratosphere 
of its academia.39 
 
There appears to be something corruptive about working to reduce the 
corruption of others! In 1996 Hong Kong’s Independent Commission 
Against Corruption arrested an US immigration agent who had dismantled 
an aliensmuggling operation. The US agent had decided that these illicit 
profits were too tempting. He was caught conspiring with Honduran and 
Hong Kong officials to create for himself a similar smuggling operation.40 
Environment laws are another relatively “new” opportunity area for 
corrupt officials. In their analysis of the tuna-dolphin controversy, Bonanno 
and Constance41 describe the opportunities for corruption created by 
environmental laws in one or several jurisdictions when corporations now 
can efficiently operate globally – moving across the world in search of 
friendlier environmental laws, cheaper labour, better taxes. 
The issue had to do with purse-seine tuna fishing that used mile long nets 
which facilitated huge catches of tuna – as well as huge catches of dolphins. 
The US passed regulations prohibiting this form of fishing. Among the 
“legitimate” evasive strategies are the schemes that have boats reflagged 
under foreign nations to avoid the regulations – but in addition there were 
“illegitimate” schemes to launder tuna via transhipments to third-party 
countries for import into the United States. Likewise, the US protective 
tariffs on garlic in California have meant that there is now an underground 
garlic smuggling market that launders foreign produced garlic through 
 various jurisdictions to allow it to be sold in the US.42 These import and re-
routing activities benefit greatly from corrupt officials. 
Police corruption has long been a concern in Canada and elsewhere. 
Infrequent but highly publicized police corruption cases come to the 
public’s attention. Both individual reasons and organizational failings 
combine to explain this phenomena. For example, the new proceeds-of-
crime legislation that is being introduced in many jurisdictions encourage 
the police to engage in extensive money laundering investigations, sting 
operations and laundering store-front operations. Combined with the large 
seizures in drugs and cash, these policing operations potentially make the 
police services vulnerable to greater corruption. 
Different cities across Canada have different reputations for corruption 
within their police departments. Interestingly this is also true in terms of the 
involvement of the RCMP within the cities. It is impossible to make empirical 
comparisons across jurisdictions because corruption is only “seen” when it 
fails. It is conceivable that the more sophisticated, more entwined corruption 
involving police forces, continues unidentified in diverse forces. 
There is the tendency, noted in the NY Knapp Commission,43 for the forces 
involved in these scandals to identify a corrupt officer and for the force to 
distance themselves from him/her. The issue becomes not an organizational 
failure but the problem of a weak individual who was inappropriate for police 
work. The rejection of this approach was confirmed by the 1994 Mollen 
Commission44 also in NY where systemic organizational issues were noted 
in explaining the corruption within the NYPD. 
In a classic study of police work, Peter Manning and L.J. Redlinger45 
refer to the “invitational edge” of corruption when the officer can sense most 
strongly the temptation with little interference from organizational regulation, 
control and supervision. While Canada has resisted the US model whereby the 
 police receive direct benefit from seizures, there still is enthusiasm for the big 
drug and proceeds seizures. An internal RCMP working paper prepared by 
Brian Abrams (1995) outlines a number of ways in which the police violated 
either the law or the public’s trust. 
The activities involve either deviance in the sense of violations of the 
law in order to make the arrests, or corruption for personal gain. Three 
specific corruption cases illustrate the role played by family loyalties, drug 
addictions, and greed. In one case an RCMP member sold police information 
to a Colombian cocaine trafficking group in which his brother was a member. 
A Montreal lawyer, involved in the operation, was murdered the day before 
the corrupt member fled Canada. In another case one officer who had first 
an alcohol abuse problem and then a prescription pharmaceutical addiction 
attended a 28-day treatment program after which the RCMP assigned him 
to the exhibit vault in a drug section! The exhibits were destroyed on paper 
but were stock piled in the vault. The officer began to use cocaine from the 
vault. He plead guilty to possessing cocaine. In a final example, greed rather 
than addiction or family loyalty was involved. A staff sargent from Vancouver 
stole money from the exhibit area of the integrated anti-proceeds of crime 
unit. By the time that the theft was discovered, this charismatic officer had 
been seconded to the UN and the discovery destroyed a very promising career. 
With the advantage of hindsight, each one of these cases illustrates 
organization weaknesses: too much emphasis on success without adequate 
supervision; compromises in background checks in exchange for diversity 
of language skills of potential undercover officers; lack of bifurcated 
accountability structures in highly vulnerable areas such as the exhibit areas. 
 
 
 
 Systemic corruption 
 
An almost comic sequence of scandals in Brazil began with the 
impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 for influence 
peddling and graft two years after he was elected on an anti-corruption 
platform. Many of his congressional accusers were then charged with 
embezzlement linked to powerful committees on which they served. 
Not surprisingly, a 1993 Brazilian poll revealed diminishing support 
for democracy; the reason most often chosen was “corruption/weak 
government”.46 
 
Perhaps the category of corruption that has gained the most publicity is 
this systemic category where the entire society is open to diverse forms of 
corruption. Most notable are the systems where the leadership is found to be 
draining the country of its wealth. The looting of countries is usually done 
over an extended period prior to the forced or voluntary exit of the leader. Only 
then is it evident how much wealth has been moved outside of the countries. 
This form of corruption is a mere combination of the previous three with the 
elite deeply implicated in the corruption for personal gain. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While reducing corruption, however it is defined, is a valuable activity, some 
strategies may have less positive results. One must critically evaluate those 
movements that become “crusades”. The narrow international focus on 
business related corruption is driven too blatantly by the 
commercial/financial interests of the west, at the expense of the less 
 developed nations. There may be unanticipated consequences from the 
labelling of nations as being corruption and fraud prone. We speak of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy when initially incorrect situations are acted upon as 
if they were true and they become true as a consequence. Receiving a 
high-corruption ranking on the TI and the Huberts surveys informs the 
world that certain practices will be tolerated or exected within those 
countries. This may in fact serve to encourage and normalize the various 
corrupt payments. 
The FATF-type evaluation procedures whereby the member states evaluate 
each other, is the model being used by the Council of Europe to monitor its 
anti-money laundering measures and a similar evaluation will be applied to 
the forthcoming conventions on corruption (1997). Evaluating anti-corruption 
legislation, policies and sanctions from within each country under study 
will place the corruption into its context and make the exercise one that 
is more likely to have positive results. The difficulty arises that corruption 
is not “alien” but very much entwined into the fabric of societies, and like a 
chameleon, it takes very different forms depending on its environment. 
Corruption is “useful” to some governments, some law enforcement 
officers, some corporations, and some members of the public via their 
support of illicit commodities. Therefore, one does not corruption-proof a 
jurisdiction. Rather it is a constant struggle to gain and maintain a culture of 
intolerance to corruption. A change of personnel or a change of the 
environment (economic, political or social) may jeopardize this culture. 
When the international community focuses on specific aspects of 
corruption, those are the aspects that will be identified, and targeted as 
being corruption. The societally approved of, or at least socially ignored, 
forms of corruption will be missed in the debate. 
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